The 'Shares' (short for: 'shared responsibility in international law') project regarding the international protection of refugees proceeds from the assumption of 'collective responsibility' for refugees. 1 This assumption reminded me of a reference to a legendary essayist on 'Snakes in Ireland' who simply wrote, "There are no snakes in Ireland". 2 The question I will, therefore, address is whether this assumption is justified.
The question is a complex one since it is not clear what 'collective responsibility', also by way of synonym referred to as 'shared responsibility', actually designates. Which collective, first of all, is referred to? What is the relevant collective? Secondly, what does 'sharing' in this respect mean? Thirdly, what is the content of this collective or shared responsibility, that is, beyond the general reference to 'refugee protection'? There are, in short, three preliminary questions that should be posed: (1) which collective? (2) what does sharing mean in this respect?, and (3) what specific obligations regarding the protection of refugees are possibly shared?
WHICH COLLECTIVE(S)?
The collective whom is assumed to share responsibility is as yet unspecified and not immediately obvious either, especially not since more than one collective can be identified that would be relevant in the context of refugees.
In view of the international scope and nature of the problem of refugees, the collective could be taken to refer to the international community as the totality of individual states. Illustrative of this are the frequent calls on this community to recognize or, rather, assume collective responsibility for particular refugee situations, such as the crisis in the Great Lakes region, 3 and refugee problems such as protracted refugee situations. 4 The mere fact that such calls are necessary appears to be indicative of the lack of any collective obligations in this respect. A complicating factor is that the international community in the sense of the totality of sovereign states includes a substantial number of states that are not parties to the relevant international refugee law instruments. Put differently, although the 'refugee problem' is considered to be an international one, this recognition has not resulted in formal equality of legal obligations pertaining to refugees: a substantial number of states, amounting to 25%, chose not to act upon this collective concern.
An alternative collective that is frequently called upon is the 'humanitarian community'. It was called upon, for instance, to prevent and respond to sexual violence against women and girls in refugee settings. 5 This community is more extensive than the 'international community' in that it includes, apart from states, international humanitarian organizations and NGOs. Another collective that figures in the context of refugee problems is the 'donor community', 6 a much smaller community than the 'international community' if recourse is had to the list of major donor states which are responsible for answering UNHCR's annual call for voluntary contributions.
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Calling upon indeterminate collectives may well be tantamount to a voice crying in the wilderness bound to fall on deaf ears, and I would, therefore, like to narrow the search for the relevant collective to the universal international refugee law regime, more in particular states parties to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (hereafter: 1951 Convention) on the one hand, and the United Nations as representative of the international community on the other, and thus include the 25% states who are not party to the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (hereafter: 1967 Protocol). The reason to focus on the international refugee law regime, in the narrow sense just indicated, is based on the observation that it originated in the recognition that the problem of refugees is international in scope and nature, 8 a recognition that induced both the adoption of the 1951 Convention and the establishment of UNHCR. The question is whether that recognition gave rise, at the time, to any form of shared responsibility and, if not, whether the regime has since converted the sense of collective concern into shared responsibility.
3.
WHAT DOES 'SHARING' MEAN?
In order to be able to answer this question, the meaning of 'sharing' should be elucidated. The elucidation proceeds from municipal law constructs. Although it is a moot point whether the relevant principles can be transposed to international law, this point need not detain us for the principles are merely used as a heuristic device. 'Sharing' responsibility either means that two or more actors are jointly responsible to achieve a particular result, they, put differently, have combined to achieve a collective purpose. When they fail to accomplish this purpose, they are solidarily liable; their share of liability as between themselves may, however, be subject to a predetermined amount. Alternatively, 'sharing' means dividing and parcelling out in shares, in short: apportioning responsibility. When the desired result fails to materialize liability follows the apportionment made; the resulting -several 5 -liability is proportionate to this apportionment. It is submitted that joint responsibility is not part of the universal international refugee law regime characteristic for which is the apportioning of responsibility. This, in turn, entails that the third question -which obligations regarding the protection of refugees are possibly shared? -becomes irrelevant.
4.
THE ORIGINAL APPORTIONMENT
The current international, universal, refugee law regime was drafted in the wake of the Second World War. The vast extent of displacement caused by that war gave rise to the creation of various agencies including the International Refugee Organization charged with voluntary repatriation and resettlement. When it ceased to exist, the 'refugee problem' had not been solved: there were still refugees, consisting of the so-called 'hard core' for whom no resettlement places could be found and 'new' post-hostility refugees mainly from eastern Europe. This refugee problem was considered to be the responsibility of 'the international community', and the IRO suggested the United Nations take responsibility for it.
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When the refugee problem was thereupon discussed in the UN, two key decisions were made regarding the apportioning of responsibility for the protection of refugees. The first decision was that the responsibility for the protection of refugees would rest with the states on whose territory they found refuge, and secondly, that refugees would no longer be the responsibility of an international organization.
10 In the words of the then Secretary-General, the new, post-IRO phase: "will be characterized by the fact that the refugees will lead an independent life in the countries which have given them shelter.
[…] the refugees will no longer be maintained by an international organization as they are at present".
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This decision had profound repercussions for UNHCR, which would, unlike the IRO, be anything but an operational agency. UNHCR was merely to supplement the efforts of states that were, preferably, governed by the 1951 Convention. The functions assigned to UNHCR in its Statute are accordingly of an indirect nature and wholly geared to supporting the allocation of responsibility for the protection of refugees to individual states. "It was emphasized by the General Assembly that responsibilities for care and maintenance as well as for resettlement would have to be borne by those governments in whose territories the refugees found themselves. UNHCR would not fill the function of an international authority for the protection of refugees as IRO had done to some extent but rather the role of a mediator who would make his good offices available to both refugees and governments". 
THE LACK OF A DISTRIBUTIVE MECHANISM
Whereas UNHCR was consciously given a universal mandate, after all a United Nations agency, the recognition of the international scope and nature of the problem of refugees did not necessarily mean that states were prepared to consider this to be tantamount to a universal problem for which they bore responsibility. The awareness of the (possibly) universal scope of the problem induced the drafters of the 1951 Convention to instead hedge in the definition of refugee by limitations as a result of which the problem to be addressed was reduced in time and space. It was in essence confined to (known) European refugees, and any sense of collective responsibility for a problem which had, from the outset, been characterized as an international one -presumably, not merely European -was consequently denied. Even thus confined, the responsibility for those refugees 9 Not all states were, however, members of the United Nations at the time. Illustrative for the wish to engage the international community at large, that is, including states not members of the United Nations is the decision to include those states in the advisory body of UNHCR, see Art. was not shared but made subject to contingency: the responsibility of states would only be triggered when refugees would come within the jurisdictional orbit of an individual state: "The approach taken [was] essentially an 'individualistic' one with the responsibility for the refugee problem devolving entirely on the receiving State". 13 As a result, states would only become responsible for part of the problem: solely that part that consists of the refugees who happen to seek refuge in their respective territories.
The responsibility of individual states would be triggered, I said, when a refugee would come within the jurisdictional orbit of that state. This is an implicit reference to the prohibition of refoulement.
14 Whilst this prohibition secures the protection of refugees, it causes, simultaneously, huge disparities in terms of distribution. By virtue of geographical proximity to the country of origin, enhanced by no entry devices and deterrence practices of other states, 15 some states may end up with huge refugee populations, sometimes even disproportionately large when compared to the size of the hosting population or per capita income GDP in the country of refuge. Since the 1951 Convention does not comprise any "substantive provision […] relating to the country of origin or to other States in the context of international solidarity and co-operation in burden sharing", 16 states that observe the prohibition of refoulement are subject to its indiscriminate effects in terms of numbers of refugees they are thus forced to host.
It was not that the drafters had been unaware of the possibility that some states could be confronted with larger numbers of refugees than others. France, most likely since it was hosting Spanish refugees at the time and hence aware of the exceptional nature of the burden assumed by receiving states, 17 suggested to inserting the following provision in the Preamble to the 1951 Convention:
18 "But considering that the exercise of the right of asylum places an undue burden on certain countries because of their geographical situation, and that a satisfactory solution of a problem of which the United Nations has recognized the international scope and nature cannot be achieved without international cooperation to help to distribute refugees throughout the world". 19 It explained that this paragraph "recalled the need for a collective effort to solve the problem of refugees and to help to distribute them throughout the world", 20 but was nonetheless not intended to impose on states any obligation with respect to the right of asylum or otherwise. 21 The proposal met with criticism since it did not correspond with the substantive body of the Convention and would therefore be out of place in the preamble. 22 It was consequently not accepted and gave way 13 G. "Considering that the grant of asylum may place unduly heavy burdens on certain countries, and that a satisfactory solution of a problem of which the United Nations has recognized the international scope and nature cannot therefore be achieved without international co-operation".
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The possible incidence of huge disparities was revisited at the Conference of Plenipotentiaries that adopted the 1951 Convention and it led to the following recommendation:
"that Governments continue to receive refugees in their territories and that they act in concert in a true spirit of international co-operation in order that these refugees may find asylum and the possibility of resettlement".
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This recommendation focuses on refugees rather than on the states that are called upon to host those refugees. The present wording originates, however, in a proposal that did address the burden incurred by states:
"RECOMMENDS all governments to undertake jointly with the countries of first reception to bear the costs arising out of the right of asylum in respect of refugees whose lives are in danger".
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The Holy See proposed this recommendation, remarkable both for its emphasis on expenses and its sense of shared responsibility. 26 Although the desire for international solidarity in the discharge of responsibilities relating to the protection of (political) refugees was applauded, 27 its inclusion was objected to on account of the financial burden it would entail. The US representative observed "he could not hold out hope that it would assume further financial commitments after the termination of the International Refugee Organization".
28 Similar objections were voiced by the United Kingdom:
"While recognizing the validity of the expression therein of the ideal principle that the financial burden and heavy responsibilities of countries of first refuge should be equally shared by all governments, he felt that it was essential the Conference should bear in mind the difficulties which, under present conditions, governments experienced in committing themselves to such an undertaking as that contemplated". 29 
SIXTY YEARS LATER
Sixty years later, the structure of the international refugee law regime is still the same even though the refugee definition has been divested from its temporal limitation and consequently from the possibility of a corresponding geographical limitation save for the few states that decided to maintain this geographical limitation as they are entitled to also under the terms of the 1967 the proposal of the representative of Belgium to insert the pertinent provision in the operative part of the Convention (UN doc. E/AC.7/SR.166 at 16-17), a proposal that was not considered, most likely on account of the fact that it was never submitted in the form of a formal proposal, cf. Protocol: individual states still bear the responsibility for the refugees they host. 30 The limitations of the international refugee law regime, however, in particular the indiscriminate effects observance of the prohibition of refoulement entails, have made themselves felt: not all individual states can cope with the resulting responsibility which is sometimes exceptionally large, giving rise to calls for burden-sharing. Calls that have not so far resulted in a more equitable distribution of responsibilities among states despite attempts to that effect most notably in the form of the 'Convention Plus initiative' of the High Commissioner. 31 An initiative that failed since it did not address the lack of a distributive mechanism in the Convention, omitted to address the question why states should engage in burden-sharing, and lost itself in highly specific issues without explaining how these would contribute to an effective system of global burden-sharing. 32 When the international refugee law regime was created, the collective responsibility of the international community or rather the recognition that the problem of refugees is of international scope and concern resulted in transferring the international aspect of the problem to the United Nations, more in particular UNHCR whose "cardinal function" is "to provide international protection to refugees on behalf of the international community". 33 When the United Nations decided to establish UNHCR, the General Assembly explicitly recognized "the responsibility of the United Nations for the international protection of refugees". 34 Although UNHCR too refers to the international community as a whole to provide the international protection to refugees, 35 it nonetheless emphasizes the original allocation of responsibility, that is, the responsibility of the states hosting refugees, 36 and its own mere supplementary role in providing international protection that involves, "above all", "ensuring that Governments take the necessary action to protect all refugees within their territory, as well as persons seeking admission at their borders who may be refugees". 37 The question is whether or not the present day allocation of the responsibility to protect refugees corresponds with this statement.
'WE LIVE IN A COUNTRY OF UNHCR'
The role of UNHCR has changed dramatically over the past 60 years, and it has turned into the opposite of what had been intended: UNHCR is as operational as its predecessor, the IRO. It currently employs 6.880 staff members, over 80% of who operate in the field in some 123 states where it has 396 offices, yielding a budget of more than 3 billion USD. Those figures are indicative of the fact that the protection of refugees is no longer exclusively borne by individual countries of refuge. The current extent of UNHCR's operationality can largely be attributed to two factors. First of all, to an unequal distribution of burdens (80% of all refugees are hosted by developing states). Secondly, to a lack of capacity: not all states are capable of protecting refugees, they simply lack the means, and hence "they need to receive the assistance of the international community to enable them to do so". 38 The question is whether assistance that is provided to compensate large numbers of refugees and/or incapacity in the sense indicated has resulted in a mere shift in responsibility -that is, an alternative apportioning -or given way to joint responsibility. The answer is affirmative with respect to shifting responsibility: the tasks UNHCR assumes have resulted in a weakening of the principle that governments have the primary responsibility for the "welfare" of refugees on their territory. 39 The main reason for this is the increasing responsibility UNHCR assumes for in particular long-term 'care and maintenance' programmes for refugees in countries of refuge. 40 Characteristic for these programmes is "the extent to which it endowed UNHCR with the responsibility for the establishment of systems and services for refugees that were parallel to, separate from, and in many cases better resourced than those available to the local population". 41 As a result, "a widespread perception" was created "that the organization was a surrogate state, complete with its own territory (refugee camps), citizens (refugees), public services (education, health care, water, sanitation, etc.) and even ideology (community participation, gender equality)". 42 UNHCR is not merely assuming tasks that are properly those of states, this assumption, as if interconnecting tanks, entails a limited role for the country of refuge whose role is confined to the admission and recognition of refugees, and sometimes even recognition is performed by UNHCR on behalf of the host state, protection against refoulement, and the provision of security to refugees. 43 It should not, therefore, come as a surprise that refugees express their frustration at UNHCR rather than the government of the country of refuge. The protest slogan of Sudanese refugees in Egypt addressed to UNHCR is a case in point: "We live in a country of UNHCR".
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UNHCR nonetheless frequently recalls the original allocation of responsibilities, that is, it emphasizes that states have the primary responsibility for refugees on their territory. 45 Meanwhile, however, it secured a territorial foothold in many states which enables it to assume tasks in the territory of states. Its presence in states is usually governed by a host state agreement, 'cooperation agreement' in UNHCR terminology, which comprises the following provision: 
47
Practice demonstrates a more substantial role for UNHCR in the field, and the cooperation agreements provide the legal basis for UNHCR's providing protection and humanitarian assistance to refugees and other persons of its concern in the territory of (host) states. 48 The question is whether they have jointly converted the original allocation and division of responsibilities between UNHCR and states into shared responsibility. Although it has become difficult to identify the specific apportioning that applies, it will moreover vary per state, it is submitted it does not: even while UNHCR has been given a more extensive mandate in the territory of states, the various responsibilities remain distinct: the host state or country of refuge is 39 A. Slaughter, J. Crisp, "A surrogate state? The role of UNHCR in protracted refugee situations", UNHCR Research Paper No. 168 (2009) at 2. Note that the reference is to the 'welfare' of refugees rather than their 'protection'. 40 Ibid. at 1. 41 Ibid. at 8. 42 Ibid. 43 Ibid. at 1-2. 44 See inter alia, C. Moulin, P. Nyers, "`We Live in a Country of UNHCR' -Refugee Protests and Global Political Society", 1 International Political Sociology 2007, 356-372. 45 UN doc. A/AC.96/1024 (Note on International Protection), para. 5. 46 Not all cooperation agreements that have been concluded comprise this particular provision, but most do by virtue of the fact that UNHCR introduced the use of a model cooperation agreement. For the text of this model agreement, see Zieck, 2006 , op. cit. supra n. 10, Annex 2. 47 The reference to respectively Article 35 and Article 2 are omitted in case the agreement is concluded with a state that is not a party to the relevant instruments. 48 On the cooperation agreements, see M.Y.A. Zieck, 2006 , op. cit. supra n. 10, in particular Ch. 7. ultimately solely responsible for the protection of the refugees it hosts. 49 It can hardly be otherwise: UNHCR is a non-territorial entity and its role is in that sense confined to do whatever it can to induce the government of the host state to grant protection, and to provide assistance that facilitates the government to do so, alternatively temporarily assuming some of its tasks. It can thereby rely on the norms that govern the cooperation with the host state by virtue of the cooperation agreement, norms that are all, incidentally, predicated on the original allocation of responsibility regarding the protection of refugees, which is especially useful in states that are not parties to the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol.
THE UNITED NATIONS BEYOND UNHCR
So far the focus was on UNHCR, but the search for the relevant collective set out with a reference to the United Nations as representative of the international community of states. The focus on UNHCR comes natural since the General Assembly whose involvement with refugees became part of its functions since the United Nations was created, decided to charge UNHCR with its responsibilities in this respect. Beyond resolutions which directly relate to UNHCR, the General Assembly addresses refugee problems in resolutions that partake of the legally non-committal rhetoric of collective responsibility. It, for instance, recognized "the universal collective responsibility to share the urgent and overwhelming burden of African refugees". 50 Beyond the General Assembly and UNHCR, reference could be made to the Security Council, 51 a collective within the United Nations to whom the members have conferred the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. This responsibility encompasses increasingly refugee situations and problems. The question is whether its acts -decisions, recommendations, resolutions -are indicative of shared responsibility.
Leaving its calls that address the 'international community' at large with respect to refugee (related) problems aside, more specific calls of the Security Council serve to reinforce the position of UNHCR to enable it to implement its Statutory tasks, for instance by urging states to cooperate with UNHCR with respect to voluntary repatriation of refugees, 52 to implement agreements governing voluntary repatriation, 53 and to granting UNHCR access, 54 and are reminded of their obligations regarding refugees including their right of return, the responsibility to create conditions which allow refugees to return, 55 to preserve the civilian nature of refugee camps, 56 and more in general, to fulfil their obligations under international refugee law.
Congo (MONUC, MONUSCO), 61 Darfur (UNAMID), 62 Rwanda (UNAMIR), 63 the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), 64 Somalia (UNOSOM II), 65 Western Sahara (MINURSO), 66 Afghanistan (UNAMA), 67 Kosovo (UNMIK), 68 Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), 69 and Georgia (UNOMIG) 70 reveals that their tasks consist of the facilitation and coordination of the voluntary return of refugees, monitoring the voluntary and safe return of refugees in cooperation with UNHCR, assisting UNHCR in the provision of logistical support for the repatriation of refugees, supporting the government's efforts to create an environment conducive to the voluntary repatriation of refugees, contributing to a secure environment for the sustainable return of refugees to their homes, assisting the government in facilitating the voluntary and safe return of refugees, and liaising with the government and UNHCR in support of efforts to relocate refugee camps which are in close proximity to the border.
The acts of the Security Council, whether calls on states or mandates given to peacekeeping operations, whilst issued on behalf of a collective -states members of the United Nations -do not appear to be indicative of shared responsibility: they rather seem to confirm the system of several responsibility by means of repeatedly reminding states of their obligations regarding refugees including cooperation with UNHCR in the exercise of its Statutory functions and thus contribute to realizing the international responsibility the international community as represented in the General Assembly agreed to assume (but not to finance) and assign to UNHCR.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS: INDEED, NO SNAKES IN IRELAND
The current universal international refugee law regime involves different collectives: the international community of states as represented in the United Nations, states parties to the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol as well as states not parties to either one of those two instruments who are bound to observe the prohibition of refoulement by virtue of customary international law. The recognition of the international scope and nature of the refugee problem, mitigated by the experiences gained after the Second World War, led to the establishment of a regime with a clear-cut allocation of responsibilities: individual states were to be responsible for the protection of refugees they happen to host, and UNHCR was assigned to supplement their efforts on behalf of the international community mainly by directing individual states to behave according to the set allocation. Large numbers of refugees, coupled to incapacity of states of refuge led to a changed role for UNHCR: it may have to assume functions in the territory of states that were originally, and still are, considered to be those of states themselves. Actual situations may, in other words, require changes in the original apportioning of responsibilities that consist of the international community in the form of UNHCR assuming more responsibilities and states less. Such shifts do not, however, alter the nature of the apportionment of several responsibility for the protection of refugees.
States display a tendency to minimize, evade or even all together deny the obligations they incur by virtue of the prohibition of refoulement. This practice is both demonstrative of and a response to the absence of collective or joint responsibility regarding the protection of refugees. This absence or lack can only be remedied by a system that secures not just joint responsibility but joint and several responsibility whereby individual states have the right of recourse to other states to recover any 'overpayment'. 72 Put differently, collective responsibility requires a mechanism of burden sharing that compensates the current indiscriminate effects of the observance of the prohibition of refoulement in terms of number of refugees for which states become individually responsible. In order to exchange the current system of several responsibility, any such burdensharing mechanism requires the participation of all states unlike the current feeble mechanisms in place, which are wholly contingent on the benevolent discretion of (very few) states and not necessarily geared to compensating unduly heavy burdened states either. 73 This requires exchanging the collective responsibility rhetoric regarding burden-sharing in grand statements such as in particular the Millennium Declaration, 74 and the World Summit Outcome, 75 and pledges made in the Declaration of States Parties to the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol, 76 for a nondiscretionary system of burden-sharing. 77 
